Friday, February 29, 2008

Why Roland Barhtes could not - try as he might - become a marxist

In an earlier post I addressed the mythical structure of computer games. I believe a further post is needed justify this in the face of the predominant structuralist approach to myth that Barthes inherited from Levi-Strauss. The structuralist conception of myth is that of “a mode of signification, a form.” (Barthes 1972, 109) This kind of reading is, as Bourdieu (1991, 164) noted in regard to Levi-Strauss: “Proceeding, in accordance with Schelling’s wish, to be properly tautegorical (in opposition to allegorical) reading which refers the myth to nothing outside itself, structural analysis aims at laying bare the structure immanent in each symbolic production.” That is to say, in other words, it is hermetic, or to put still another way, it is ahistorical. Then one need not wonder why Barhtes' would be marxist part of Mythologies is so unconvincing.

Historically speaking art takes the form of myth in the function of what Habermas (1962/1990) has called "representative publicity", the ritual representation of feudal authority. It is ritual that inscribes art with mythological meaning, closes the reading, imposes a pattern of signal and noise. When Barthes (1978) claimed that "art is without noise", he failed to contextualize this claim to the specific historical context of bourgeois autonomous (or rather quasi-autonomous, as Bürger (1974/2005) claimed) art. Two factors emancipated art from under ritual practices: technical reproducibility and commodification. Both processes made it impossible to limit the use of art to ritual practice in which mythical meaning could be superimposed - a basic condition, the monopoly over the use of art, was no longer met.

The problem with structuralist analysis of myth is firstly that it obscures the historical specificity of myth. If myth exists in bourgeois society it is qualitatively different from the one in feudal society, it is reproduced through different mechanisms and is sure to be received, or "read", differently because of different social conditions. Secondly a purely tautegorical analysis of myth has no emancipatory potential. Knowing about the structure of myth does not mean we can be free from it. For that the analysis of social forces and formations that create it is needed.

References:
Barthes, Roland. . Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives. In Image, Music, Text. New York: Hill and Wang

Benjamin, Walter. 1936/2006. Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1992. Language & Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bürger, Peter. 1974/2005: Theorie der Avantgarde. Frankfurt am Main. Suhrkamp.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1962/1990. Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno. 1947/2004. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.

Thursday, February 28, 2008

New Media Storytelling

As I was reading an article on Wired about "A Mean Storytelling Machine" I was wondering whether computer games were becoming the prime storytellers of our time and what the implications of this development were. Some cursory observations can be made:

- The player does not gain significantly in interactivity. Most computer games are still very much linear: the player does not have much chance of changing the outcome of the story. His role is still very much that of reading, if we refer to Barthes' (1974) idea of the readerly text: beating a linear path through the text. The fact that this linearity is obscured by positioning the player inside the story only adds to the readerly character of the text: the player is discouraged from interpretation and construction of alternative meanings, because he himself is a part of the story. A character can not at the same time act and be detached from his actions, he must choose one position. The story is in it's essence a mythical one (as understood by Benjamin (1991) and Horkheimer and Adorno (1947/2004)): the subjectivity of the player is an infernal repetition of acts that have bee pre-constructed. Like the mythical figures in the Odyssey the characters in the video game are doomed to constantly repeat the same actions: whether it is Guybrush Threepwood re-enacting his stupidity or the main character of a first person shooter compulsively destroying ever same foes - all differences between them ones of quantity, not quality (stronger weapons, tougher armour, new abilities).

- The change is rather one of identification than of interactivity. Brecht's epic theatre aimed at preventing the viewer to identify with the characters by stereotyping them. Identification, which Brecht saw as a trait of bourgeois art, was to be abandoned in favour of ideas - his characters are more than anything else allegories. Mack the knife is not a petty criminal, he represents petty criminalness. In this sense he is as mythological as any character from a video game, compulsively repeating the same patterns of behaviour as if enchanted: even as he is chased by the police and must know that the brothel will be the first place they look, he can not refrain from visiting it, even after he has been betrayed by the prostitutes at an earlier time. Computer games share this trait of stereotyping, but the position of the player is such that the player is embedded in the narrative structure, complete identification being the sine qua non of the game. In this sense computer games are returning to a pre-bourgeois era of storytelling, to that of myth.

- If, as Benjamin (1991, 439) notes, the essence of storytelling is "the ability to exchange experiences," computer games can be said to free storytelling from experience. They do not re-present experiences as they have already happened (as with the traveller, the prime example of the early storyteller, whose credibility was dependant on actually visiting the places he was giving accounts of), but have the ability to create experiences on the spot. The trend is clear: ever more realistic graphics combined with force feedback interface devices (one can even get a force feedback vest for first person shooters if one is not satisfied with a vibrating mouse) work towards replacing experience, mimicking it perfectly, not recounting it. Games tend towards constructing experience, not merely exchanging it.

References:
Barthes, Roland. 1974. S/Z. New York: Hill and Wang.

Benjamin, Walter. 1991. Gesammelte Schriften, Band II, 2: Aufsätze, Essays, Vorträge. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno. 1947/2004. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.

Tuesday, February 12, 2008

Stephen Coleman on the CIVICWEB seminar

On Tuesday, 5. February, a seminar was held at the London Knowledge Lab, concerning young people, the internet and civic participation. The main speaker was Stephen Coleman.

Stephen Coleman

Two moral narratives that always recur in debates about civic media:

- citizenship: what is it (should it be), what tools are needed; it takes a pessimistic form, there is supposedly a decline in citizenship, people are not doing what political scientist believe they should be doing. It has a normative dimension.

- technology, particular technology as a cultural fixer: they supposedly open up a space for broadening democracy. New media are particular in 4 aspects: 1) for the first time in history we are living in infromation over-abundance, 2) cheap access and low barriers to participation
3) they are interactive, 4) they have the capacity for creating decentralized horizontal networks of production and transmission

Those two narratives has two obvious limitations:
-they are normative, not empirical not descriptive
-it is very unsubtle, talks about generalities like »internet« and »citizenship« as monadic phenomena

We will consider how these narratives are applied to young people and internet, examine empirical examples of participation by young people, talk about policy implications.

Young people:
There is a stereotype of young people as apathetic. But actually it claims they are overly pathetic, but they lack removal from the sentimental feelings of the moment. Another stereotype is that they are distracted, that popular culture distracts and displaces them. Underlying it is the difference between engaging young people and engaging with young people. Government says: participate, but they actually mean: participate on our terms. The mentality is a managerial fix that needs to be done, young people need to be engaged, something has to be done to them.

Empirical examples:
- managed (top down coordinated); Hansard society's Headsup, The english school students' association, Northern Irish project Where is my public servant;
- autonomous (young people are doing it for themselves); students against sweatshops, George fox 6 campaign, Educationet;

Managed projects tend to be better resourced and have connections to authority. Managed projects connect young people to political institutions, they are about being heard (therapeutic approach), regulated speech, accept government funding, see young people as apprentice citizens

Autonomous projects tend to create peer-to-peer networks, want to make actions, speech is democratic, independent from government and have an alternative view of citizenship. Autonomous projects are often exclusive, might be just talking shops.

10 principles for policy:

- power holders should fund but not directly interfere with civic online spaces for young people;
- these online spaces should provide horizontal and vertical (to power holders) links;
- young people should set the terms for debate without external censorship;
- the terms of the influence of participation should be explicitly outlined;
- we have to build deliberative structures, where different opinions can meet;
- young people should be encouraged to counter social injustice and broaden the political agenda in any way they see fit;
- e-citizenship does not exclude everyday political experience, negotiation of feelings ... Citizenship is changing, becoming more fluid;
- young people are encouraged to use technology innovatively;
- they must be able to challenge notions of young people, citizenship, national identity;
- policy will be determined in partnership between policy makers and young people;