Practical mediation

In his first thesis on Feuerbach Marx charted out the plan for a theory of mediation that would find its full development only in Adorno's idea of negative dialectics. The first thesis reads:

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.

According to Marx idealism develops the active side, that is the synthesising activity of the subject, but frames it abstractly. Kant's transcendental subject has to be abstracted from any empirical detetrminants if Kant's aim was to be achieved, the aim to save objectivity through the workings of the subject. If this subject was to be a historical subject its categories and contemplative forms (Anschaungsformen) could not claim objectivity, hence the possibility of synthetic judgements a priori (that is judgements that are not tautological, but still have validity independent of any and all empirical reality), that Kant aims to prove in the Critique of pure reason, would not exist. Marx has shown us the flaws of an abstract idea of mediation of the object through the subject, as is present in Kant as well as Hegel. The popular slogan of Marx merely inverting Hegel is ridiculous because it misses this fundamental point. Marx did not just turn Hegel on his head, but has discovered history proper, discovered that all knowledge is not mediated through an abstract subject, but through its empirical historical manifestation. This actually existing individual relates to the world through social labour, hence mediation must be thought of as an inherently practical activity.